Documentation > Userspace Clients > global Mode

`global` Mode

Index

Description
Syntax
Examples
Keys

Description

Controls several of Jool’s internal variables.

Syntax

(jool_siit | jool) global display [--csv]
(jool_siit | jool) global update <flag key> <new value>

Examples

Display the current configuration, keys and values:

# jool_siit global display

Pause Jool:

# jool global update manually-enabled false

Turn “address dependent filtering” on:

$ # true, false, 1, 0, yes, no, on and off all count as valid booleans.
# jool global update address-dependent-filtering true

Update the plateaus list:

# jool_siit global update mtu-plateaus "6000, 5000, 4000, 3000, 2000, 1000"

Keys

The following flag keys are available:

`manually-enabled`

Type: Boolean
Default: True
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)

Resumes (true) and pauses (false) translation of packets.

When Netfilter Jool is paused, packets skip it and are handled normally by the kernel. When iptables Jool is paused, it drops the traffic that matches its iptables rules.

Timers will not be paused. BIB/session entries and stored packets might die while Jool is idle.

`pool6`

Type: IPv6 prefix
Default: null
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: Both
Source: RFC 6052

Updates the IPv6 Address Pool prefix.

This flag is SIIT-only. It is no longer possible for NAT64 instaces to change the prefix that was set during the instance add due to race conditions.

If you want, the prefix can unset through the null keyword:

user@T:~# jool_siit global update pool6 null

`lowest-ipv6-mtu`

Type: Integer
Default: 1280
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6
Source: RFC 7915

You want to set this value as the minimum MTU accross all your IPv6 networks. All incoming IPv4 packets containing a disabled Don’t Fragment (DF) flag will be fragmented to lowest-ipv6-mtu size once translated to IPv6.

Why? Because the IPv6 header lacks a DF counterpart. All IPv6 packets behave as if DF were enabled. If Jool translates a DF-disabled IPv4 packet into an IPv6 packet, and the resulting packet is larger than the available MTU, then it will not be able to reach its destination. If the IPv4 note insists on sending such DF-disabled large packets in hopes that the IPv6 router will eventually fragment them, the result will be a black hole.

This flag does not affect DF-enabled IPv4 packets, because those operate under normal Path MTU Discovery rules, so never rely on fragmenting routers.

To enhance performance, you want to minimize fragmentation, which means you want to assign the largest possible value to this flag. You do not want to assign a value that is larger than your overall minimum IPv6 MTU however, as this may end up causing black holes as explained above.

A more graphic explanation can be found here.

`logging-debug`

Type: Boolean
Default: false
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Source: Issue 336

Print the instance’s debug messages on the log?

The logging messages can typically be found by querying the dmesg program, or (if syslog is listening) the /var/log/syslog file.

Here’s an example of a successful IPv4->IPv6 SIIT translation:

$ sudo jool_siit global update logging-debug true
$ dmesg -t
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: ===============================================
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Packet: 198.51.100.2->192.0.2.33
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: UDP 4000->2000
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Translating the Packet.
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Result: 2001:db8:1c6:3364:2::->2001:db8:1c0:2:21::
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Routing: 2001:db8:1c6:3364:2::->2001:db8:1c0:2:21::
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Packet routed via device 'to_client_v6'.
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Sending packet.
Jool SIIT/6b514d00/default: Success.

The label SIIT/6b514d00/default is the instance identifier (<stateness>/<namespace>/<name>). See instance display.

Here’s an example of a successful IPv6->IPv4 NAT64 translation:

$ sudo jool global update logging-debug true
$ dmesg -t
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: ===============================================
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Packet: 2001:db8::5->64:ff9b::c000:205
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: TCP 2000->4000
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Step 1: Determining the Incoming Tuple
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Tuple: 2001:db8::5#2000 -> 64:ff9b::c000:205#4000 (TCP)
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Done step 1.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Step 2: Filtering and Updating
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: BIB entry: 2001:db8::5#2000 - 192.0.2.2#2000 (TCP)
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Session entry: 2001:db8::5#2000 - 64:ff9b::c000:205#4000 | 192.0.2.2#2000 - 192.0.2.5#4000 (TCP)
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Done: Step 2.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Step 3: Computing the Outgoing Tuple
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Tuple: 192.0.2.2#2000 -> 192.0.2.5#4000 (TCP)
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Done step 3.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Step 4: Translating the Packet
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Routing: 192.0.2.2->192.0.2.5
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Packet routed via device 'to_client_v4'.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Done step 4.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Sending packet.
Jool NAT64/6b514d00/default: Success.

By default, debug logging needs to be enabled on a per-instance basis, and only prints debug messages that correspond to that particular instance. The compilation flag -DDEBUG enables all debug logging by default, including debug logging not associated with an instance.

Though it’s called “instance debug logging,” Jool actually uses INFO severity. This is because DEBUG level requires the -DDEBUG flag.

Make sure to disable this flag in production. It slows things down, and if syslog is listening, the log messages quickly eat up large amounts of disk space.

`address-dependent-filtering`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Scattered at RFC 6146. One summary is at the end of section 1.2.3.

Long story short:

address-dependent-filtering ON means Jool should be an (address)-restricted-cone NAT.
address-dependent-filtering OFF means Jool should be a full-cone NAT.

Long story long:

Suppose n6 is talking with n4a via the NAT64:

Fig.1: Legal chat

The relevant BIB entry is

IPv6 transport address	IPv4 transport address	Protocol
2001:db8::1#10	192.0.2.1#10	TCP

n4b realizes the existence of n6’s service, perhaps because n4a tells him about it:

Fig.2: n4b finds about n6

Then n4b tries to chat n6 too:

Fig.3: suspicious query

Because the BIB entry exists, J knows that n4b means “2001:db8::1#10” when he says “192.0.2.1#10”, so the packet can technically be translated. However, because of the session tables, J can also tell that n6 hasn’t been talking to n4b in the past.

If address-dependent-filtering is OFF, J will allow n4b’s packet through. If address-dependent-filtering is ON, J will drop n4b’s packet and respond with a “Communication Administratively Prohibited” ICMP error. This effectively wrecks any IPv4-started communication attempts, even if there are BIB entries (static or otherwise).

If you’re using the NAT64 to publish a IPv6-only service to the IPv4 Internet, it makes sense for address-dependent-filtering to be OFF. This is because clients are expected to find out about the IPv6 service on their own, and the server doesn’t normally start packet streams.
If you’re using the NAT64 to allow IPv6 nodes to browse the IPv4 Internet, please consider the recommendation on RFC6888 REQ-7 before setting address-dependent-filtering to ON. While it’s true that clients choose their ports at random, so it is suspicious for random outsider nodes to guess these ports, address-dependent-filtering ON might break NAT traversal methods like STUN (or at least make some operation modes impossible) or it might impair some games and peer-to-peer applications.

`drop-icmpv6-info`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 3.5.3

If you turn this on, pings (both requests and responses) will be blocked while being translated from ICMPv6 to ICMPv4.

For some reason, we’re not supposed to block pings from ICMPv4 to ICMPv6, but since you need both a request and a response for a successful echo, the outcome seems to be the same.

This rule will not affect Error ICMP messages.

`drop-externally-initiated-tcp`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 3.5.2.2

Turn drop-externally-initiated-tcp ON to wreck any attempts of IPv4 nodes to initiate TCP communication to IPv6 nodes.

Of course, this will not block IPv4 traffic if some IPv6 node first requested it.

The filtering will be completely silent; no ICMP error (“Communication Administratively Prohibited” or otherwise) will be returned to the v4 nodes.

`udp-timeout`

Type: String (“[[HH:]MM:]SS[.mmm]” format)
Default: 5:00
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 3.5.1

When a UDP session has been lying around inactive for this long, its entry will be removed from the database automatically.

When you change this value, the lifetimes of all already existing UDP sessions are updated.

`tcp-est-timeout`

Type: Integer (“[[HH:]MM:]SS[.mmm]” format)
Default: 2:00:00
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 3.5.2.2

When an established TCP connection has remained inactive for this long, its existence will be questioned. Jool will send a probe packet to one of the endpoints and kill the session if a response is not received before the tcp-trans-timeout timeout.

When you change this value, the lifetimes of all already existing established TCP sessions are updated.

`tcp-trans-timeout`

Type: Integer (“[[HH:]MM:]SS[.mmm]” format)
Default: 4:00
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, derivatives of section 3.5.2

When an unhealthy TCP session has been lying around inactive for this long, its entry will be removed from the database automatically. An “unhealthy” session is one in which the TCP handshake has not yet been completed, it is being (or has been) terminated by the endpoints, or is technically established but has remained inactive for tcp-est-timeout time.

When you change this value, the lifetimes of all already existing transitory TCP sessions are updated.

`icmp-timeout`

Type: Integer (“[[HH:]MM:]SS[.mmm]” format)
Default: 1:00
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 3.5.3

When a ICMP session has been lying around inactive for this long, its entry will be removed from the database automatically.

When you change this value, the lifetimes of all already existing ICMP sessions are updated.

`maximum-simultaneous-opens`

Type: Integer
Default: 10
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: RFC 6146, section 5.3 (indirectly)

When an external (IPv4) node first attempts to open a connection and there’s no BIB entry for it, Jool normally answers with an Address Unreachable (type 3, code 1) ICMP error message, since it cannot know which IPv6 node the packet is heading.

In the case of TCP, the situation is a little more complicated because the IPv4 node might be attempting a Simultaneous Open of TCP Connections. To really know what’s going on, Jool has to store the packet for 6 seconds.

maximum-simultaneous-opens is the maximum amount of packets Jool will store at a time. The default means that you can have up to 10 “simultaneous” simultaneous opens; Jool will fall back to immediately answer the ICMP error message on the eleventh one.

`source-icmpv6-errors-better`

Type: Boolean
Default: True
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6 (ICMP errors only)
Source: Issue 132

For some reason, RFC 6146 wants the source of translated ICMPv6 errors to be the same as their inner packets’ destination address. This looks really weird.

Fig.4: Source better diagram

Say the link between R and n4 collapses.

n6 TCP-packets n4: 2001:db8::1 -> 64:ff9b::203.0.113.13.
T translates and forwards: 192.0.2.1 -> 203.0.113.13
R answers ICMPv4 error “Host unreachable”. The error packet’s addresses are 192.0.2.6 -> 192.0.2.1.
T translates into an IPv6 packet whose addresses are 64:ff9b::203.0.113.13 -> 2001:db8::1 (because this is the inverse of the first packet).

This breaks traceroutes. Shouldn’t it have been 64:ff9b::192.0.2.6 -> 2001:db8::1 instead?

source-icmpv6-errors-better OFF will make Jool obey RFC 6146 (and break traceroutes).
source-icmpv6-errors-better ON will translate the outer source address directly, simply appending the prefix to the source address of the original (step 3) packet.

`logging-bib`

Type: Boolean
Default: False
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Translation direction: Both
Source: RFC 6888, section 4

Enables logging of transport address mappings as they are created and destroyed. If you are a Service Provider, your government might require you to do this.

Analysis of these logs can let you know which IPv4 address and port masked your “internal” (IPv6) nodes at a certain time. Here’s a sample output:

$ jool global update logging-bib true
$ dmesg
[  312.493235] alpha 2015/4/8 16:13:2 (GMT) - Mapped 2001:db8::5#19945 to 192.0.2.2#8208 (UDP)
[  373.724229] alpha 2015/4/8 16:14:3 (GMT) - Mapped 2001:db8::8#46516 to 192.0.2.2#12592 (TCP)
[  468.675524] alpha 2015/4/8 16:15:38 (GMT) - Forgot 2001:db8::5#19945 to 192.0.2.2#8208 (UDP)

In this example,

2001:db8::5 used (its own) port 19945 to speak to someone using the UDP protocol. This someone thought 2001:db8::5’s address was 192.0.2.2, and that it was using port 8208.
Roughly a minute later, 2001:db8::8 (on port 46516) started speaking to somebody using TCP. It’s being masked as 192.0.2.2#12592. This connection has not yet ended.
Some time later, Jool forgot the UDP mapping (because of inactivity, not because the last packet happened at 16:15:38. “How much inactivity” is controlled by the timeouts - in this case, the UDP one). At this point, 192.0.2.2#8208 is free from 2001:db8::5 and Jool can reassign it.

All of this was performed by the instance whose name is “alpha.”

So, if your government comes and says “I detected somebody named 192.0.2.2#8208 did something illegal at 4:14 pm via UDP”, you can report the culprit is 2001:db8::5#19945 and free yourself from the blame.

There are several important things to notice:

Each mapping’s uniquenesss extends to the protocol. If your logging only says Mapped 2001:db8::5#19945 to 192.0.2.2#8208 (UDP), you can’t assume 2001:db8::5#19945 is 192.0.2.2#8208 on TCP as well.
Your IPv6 nodes share IPv4 addresses! Therefore, mind the ports.
There’s no information on who was 2001:db8::5 talking to. This is a good thing; it means you’re honoring your client’s privacy as much as you can.
The logging uses GMT; you might need to convert this for comfort.

This defaults to false because it generates humongous amounts of logs while active (remember you need infrastructure to maintain them). Notice the maps are dumped into the kernel log, so the messages will be mixed along with anything else the kernel has to say. The log messages will have INFO priority.

If logging the destination makes sense for you, see logging-session (below). To comply with REQ-12 of RFC 6888 you want to set loging-bib as true and logging-session as false.

`logging-session`

Type: Boolean
Default: False
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Translation direction: Both
Source: RFC 6888, section 4

Enables logging of every session as they are created and destroyed.

The format is

<instance name> <date> <time> (GMT) - <action> session <IPv6 node>|<IPv6 representation of IPv4 node>|<IPv4 representation of IPv6 node>|<IPv4 node>|Protocol

Here’s a sample output:

$ jool global update logging-session true
$ dmesg
[ 3238.087902] alpha 2015/4/8 17:1:47 (GMT) - Added session 1::5#47073|64:ff9b::c000:205#80|192.0.2.2#63527|192.0.2.5#80|TCP
[ 3238.099997] alpha 2015/4/8 17:1:47 (GMT) - Added session 1::5#47074|64:ff9b::c000:205#80|192.0.2.2#42527|192.0.2.5#80|TCP
[ 3241.624104] alpha 2015/4/8 17:1:51 (GMT) - Added session 1::5#33160|64:ff9b::c000:205#8080|192.0.2.2#15496|192.0.2.5#8080|TCP
[ 3241.630905] alpha 2015/4/8 17:1:51 (GMT) - Added session 1::5#33161|64:ff9b::c000:205#8080|192.0.2.2#7060|192.0.2.5#8080|TCP
[ 3478.498559] alpha 2015/4/8 17:5:48 (GMT) - Forgot session 1::5#47073|64:ff9b::c000:205#80|192.0.2.2#63527|192.0.2.5#80|TCP
[ 3478.499758] alpha 2015/4/8 17:5:48 (GMT) - Forgot session 1::5#47074|64:ff9b::c000:205#80|192.0.2.2#42527|192.0.2.5#80|TCP
[ 3481.632214] alpha 2015/4/8 17:5:51 (GMT) - Forgot session 1::5#33160|64:ff9b::c000:205#8080|192.0.2.2#15496|192.0.2.5#8080|TCP
[ 3481.632342] alpha 2015/4/8 17:5:51 (GMT) - Forgot session 1::5#33161|64:ff9b::c000:205#8080|192.0.2.2#7060|192.0.2.5#8080|TCP

This log is remarcably more voluptuous than logging-bib, not only because each message is longer, but because sessions are generated and destroyed more often than BIB entries. (Each BIB entry can have multiple sessions.) Because of REQ-12 from RFC 6888 section 4, chances are you don’t even want the extra information sessions grant you.

`zeroize-traffic-class`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6
Source: RFC 7915, section 4.1

The IPv6 header’s Traffic Class field is very similar to IPv4’s Type of Service (TOS).

If you leave this OFF, the TOS value will be copied directly to the Traffic Class field. If you turn this ON, Jool will always set Traffic Class as zero instead.

`override-tos`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Translation direction: IPv6 to IPv4
Source: RFC 7915, section 5.1

The IPv6 header’s Traffic Class field is very similar to IPv4’s Type of Service (TOS).

If you leave this OFF, the Traffic Class value will be copied directly to the TOS field during IPv6-to-IPv4 translations. If you turn this ON, Jool will always set TOS as tos instead.

`tos`

Type: Integer
Default: 0
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Translation direction: IPv6 to IPv4
Source: RFC 7915, section 5.1

Value to set the TOS value of the packets’ IPv4 fields during IPv6-to-IPv4 translations. This only applies when override-tos is ON.

`amend-udp-checksum-zero`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6 (UDP only)
Source: RFC 7915, section 4.5

It is legal for IPv4/UDP packets to contain zero as checksum. This is because the whole thing about UDP is that it is unreliable, and the value of checksum validation might therefore not justify its overhead.

Zero is an invalid checksum value for IPv6/UDP packets.

If amend-udp-checksum-zero is ON and a zero-checksum IPv4-UDP packet arrives, Jool will compute its checksum before translating it. This can be computationally expensive.
If amend-udp-checksum-zero is OFF and a zero-checksum IPv4-UDP packet arrives, Jool will unceremoniously drop the packet and log its addresses (with Log Level KERN_DEBUG).

This does not affect fragmented zero-checksum IPv4-UDP packets. SIIT Jool does not reassemble, which means it cannot compute the checksum. In these cases, the packet will be dropped regardless of amend-udp-checksum-zero.

Stateful NAT64 Jool always computes zero-checksums from IPv4-UDP packets. Because it reassembles, it will also do so for fragmented packets.

The JSTAT46_FRAGMENTED_ZERO_CSUM stat counts packets dropped by amend-udp-checksum-zero, as well as fragmented zero-checksum IPv4/UDP packets.

`randomize-rfc6791-addresses`

Type: Boolean
Default: ON
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: IPv6 to IPv4
Source: Issue 130

If an ICMPv6 error’s source cannot be translated, RFC 6791 wants us to assign as source a random IPv4 address from the RFC 6791 pool.

If randomize-rfc6791-addresses is ON, Jool will follow RFC 6791’s advice, assigning a random address from the pool.
If randomize-rfc6791-addresses is OFF, Jool will assign the hop limitth address from the pool.

Why? It can be argued that hop limitth is better.

`mtu-plateaus`

Type: List of Integers separated by commas (If you want whitespace, remember to quote).
Default: “65535, 32000, 17914, 8166, 4352, 2002, 1492, 1006, 508, 296, 68”
Modes: Both (SIIT and Stateful NAT64)
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6 (ICMP errors only)
Source: RFC 7915, section 4.2

When a packet should not be fragmented and doesn’t fit into a link it’s supposed to traverse, the troubled router is supposed to respond an error message indicating Fragmentation Needed. Ideally, this error message would contain the MTU of the link so the original emitter would be aware of the ideal packet size and avoid fragmentation. However, the original ICMPv4 specification did not require routers to include this information, so old ware might tend to omit it.

Backwards compatibility awards IPv4 emmiters strategies to fall back when they encounter such a situation, but IPv6 has always been designed with the field present in mind. Therefore, if Jool translates a zero-MTU ICMPv4 message into a zero-MTU ICMPv6 message, chaos might ensue (actual results will depend mainly on the IPv6 client’s implementation).

To address this problem, when Jool finds itself attempting to translate a zero-MTU message, it will replace the MTU with the greatest plateau which is lower than the original packet’s Total Length field. Admittedly, this might or might not be the correct MTU, but is a very educated guess. See this example for more details. More in-depth information can be found in RFC 1191.

Notice that the minimum IPv6 MTU is 1280. This will override the plateau result if the resulting value is less than 1280.

You don’t really need to sort the values as you input them.

`eam-hairpin-mode`

Type: enum
Default: intrinsic
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: Both (mainly v6 to v4)
Source: RFC 7757, section 4

Defines how is hairpinning handled in EAMT-translated traffic. “Hairpinning” is when an IPv6-to-IPv4 translation has to be immediately followed by a IPv4-to-IPv6 translation for the same packet. (This can happen because, according to the EAMT, the destination of the IPv4 packet represents a node in the IPv6 network.) See section 4 for a complete explanation.

eam-hairpin-mode is an enum. Its available values are none, simple and intrinsic.

`rfc6791v4-prefix`

Type: IPv4 prefix
Default: null
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: IPv6 to IPv4
Source: RFC 6791 (We have a summary.)

A pool from which Jool will extract an IPv4 address whenever it needs to deliver an ICMPv4 error, but does not otherwise have an IPv4 address to source the packet with.

If this prefix is unset, the SIIT will fall back to use its node’s own addresses. Use the keyword null to unset:

jool_siit rfc6791v4-prefix null

`rfc6791v6-prefix`

Type: IPv6 prefix
Default: null
Modes: SIIT only
Translation direction: IPv4 to IPv6
Source: Issue 176

The IPv6 counterpart of rfc6791v4-prefix.

A pool from which Jool will extract an IPv6 address whenever it needs to deliver an ICMPv6 error, but does not otherwise have an IPv6 address to source the packet with.

This can be needed when pool6 is empty and the EAMT does not span all the IPv4 routers between the SIIT and the clients.

If this prefix is unset, the SIIT will fall back to use its node’s own addresses. Use the keyword null to unset:

jool_siit rfc6791v6-prefix null

`f-args`

Type: Integer
Default: 11 (binary 1011)
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Translation direction: IPv6 to IPv4
Source: Issue 195

When choosing an IPv4 transport address to mask an IPv6 source, it is recommended that the address should be as random as possible, but at the same time, dependent of several properties from the connection. You want the randomness to enhance the defense against hijacking of flows, and you want the dependence so that similar connections share similar masks. (Which enhances reliability when IPv4 outsiders expect so.)

In other words, when translating an IPv6 packet from a new connection, the translator needs a function (F) that hashes certain fields into an IPv4 transport address (m) from pool4, which is then used as the IPv4 packet source (and stored in the BIB and session database):

F(Source IPv6 address, Destination IPv6 address, Destination port) = m

(Jool’s implementation of F is Algorithm 3 of RFC 6056.)

The following three packet flows exemplify how this works out. Let’s say 2001:db8::1 writes packet 2001:db8::1#5000 -> 64:ff9b::192.0.2.1#80.

Fig.5: f-args example

Jool needs a mask. Let’s say F’s hash yields 203.0.113.6#6789:

F(2001:db8::1, 64:ff9b::192.0.2.1, 80) = 203.0.113.6#6789

So Jool stores BIB entry 2001:db8::1#5000 | 203.0.113.6#6789 and the packet is translated as 203.0.113.6#6789 -> 192.0.2.1#80.

Now let’s say another IPv6 node (2001:db8::2) opens a socket to someone else. The new packet is 2001:db8::2#6000 -> 64:ff9b::198.51.100.4#443. F yields something else because it has been given different arguments:

F(2001:db8::2, 64:ff9b::198.51.100.4, 443) = 203.0.113.25#4421

So Jool stores BIB entry 2001:db8::2#6000 | 203.0.113.25#4421 and the packet is translated as 203.0.113.25#4421 -> 198.51.100.4#443.

Finally, the same IPv6 node needs to open another socket towards the same IPv4 service. (This often happens in multiple socket applications such as gaming. The server will, of course, expect the client’s address to be the same.) The new packet is 2001:db8::2#7000 -> 64:ff9b::198.51.100.4#443. Because all of the relevant arguments are the same, F yields the same source as in the previous flow.

F(2001:db8::2, 64:ff9b::198.51.100.4, 443) = 203.0.113.25#4421

Two BIB entries cannot share the same IPv4 transport address (a collision just happened), so Jool picks a nearby available one. It creates BIB entry 2001:db8::2#7000 | 203.0.113.25#4422 and the packet is translated as 203.0.113.25#4422 -> 198.51.100.4#443.

You can see the mechanism is designed so masks are scattered randomly across the pool4 domain as much as possible, unless the IPv4 node expects a transport source that is similar to one from a previous connection. (Including the source port in F would break this.)

That’s all well and good, but it turns out there’s at least one protocol (FTP using EPSV) in which the server expects a client to open a second connection on a similar transport source, but the connection is also supposed to interact with another server port. The mechanism explained above usually breaks this second connection because the Destination port randoms the F hash so m is not necessarily a similar source.

f-args allows you to include and exclude arguments from F. You can use this to engineer argument combinations that will be friendlier to awkwardly-designed application protocols. Keep in mind though, excluding arguments from F increases collision rate because of the reduced randomness, which is somewhat expensive to handle. (for kernel standards, anyway.)

f-args is a bit field. Each bit in f-args represents an argument to F. Activate the bit to include the respective argument (from most significant to least):

Source (IPv6) address
Source port
Destination (IPv6) address
Destination port

So, the default value (decimal 11, binary 1011) excludes source port from the equation.

To fix the FTP/EPSV problem, you would remove Destination port from F. This would force all connections involving the same nodes to be masked similarly.

Unfortunately, f-args can only be entered via its decimal representation. This is possible:

$ jool global update f-args 10

While this is not:

$ jool global update f-args 0b1010

`handle-rst-during-fin-rcv`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Translation direction: Both
Source: Issue 212

Some endpoints have a nasty habit of ending TCP connections ungracefully. Instead of performing a standard FIN handshake (FIN, FIN-ACK, ACK), they kill half-finished packet streams abruptly (FIN, RST). The current NAT64 specification does not seem to consider this, so their respective NAT64 mappings stay alive for tcp-est-timeout seconds. Since the connection is being terminated, a tcp-trans-timeout-second timeout would be more appropriate. This means these sessions stay alive for longer than they probably should.

If you activate handle-rst-during-fin-rcv, Jool will assign the transitory lifetime to connections ended with a FIN followed by a RST. This is nonstandard behavior, but should optimize pool4 utilization.

The only known downside to activating handle-rst-during-fin-rcv is that attackers can potentially terminate connections that fulfill the following conditions:

Are idle. (more than tcp-trans-timeout seconds between packets)
One endpoint has already sent a FIN.

`ss-enabled`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113

Enable/Disable Session Synchronization (SS) on the kernel module.

`ss-flush-asap`

Type: Boolean
Default: OFF
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113

Deprecated; does nothing as of Jool 4.1.13.

`ss-flush-deadline`

Type: Integer (milliseconds)
Default: 2 seconds
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113

If there are queued sessions, an SS packet will be forced out after this amount of time has ellapsed since the last. This prevents sessions from accidentally being stuck in the queue for long periods of time. (Either waiting for a Userspace ACK, or waiting for other sessions to fill up the SS packet.)

`ss-capacity`

Type: Integer
Default: 512
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113

Absolute maximum number of sessions the SS queue will allow itself to hold.

If SS cannot keep up with the amount of traffic it needs to multicast, this maximum will be reached and sessions will have to start being dropped.

Watch out for this message in the kernel logs:

joold: Too many sessions deferred! I need to drop some; sorry.

If you want to find out how many sessions have been lost, query the JSTAT_JOOLD_SSS_ENOSPC stat:

$ jool stats display --all | grep JSTAT_JOOLD_SSS_ENOSPC
JSTAT_JOOLD_SSS_ENOSPC: 0

`ss-max-payload`

Type: Integer
Default: 1452
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113

Deprecated; does nothing as of Jool 4.1.11.

`ss-max-sessions-per-packet`

Type: Integer
Default: 36
Modes: Stateful NAT64 only
Source: Issue 113, issue 410

jool session proxy is (aside from a few validations) just a bridge; it receives bytes from the kernel module, wraps them in a UDP packet and sends it to other daemons, who similarly pass the bytes untouched. They are not even aware that those bytes contain sessions.

Since fragmentation is undesired, and since the kernel module is (to all intents and purposes) the one that’s building the SS packets, it should not exceed the PMTU while doing so. The module has little understanding of the “multicast” network though, so it lacks fancy utilities to compute it. That’s where this option comes in.

ss-max-sessions-per-packet is the maximum number of sessions kernelspace Jool will transfer per Netlink packet. You want to maximize it as much as possible, while avoiding IPv4/IPv6 fragmentation.

The optimal value is floor((M - I - U - R) / S), where

M is the MTU of the path between your proxies (usually 1500),
I is the size of the header of the IP protocol your proxies will use to exchange sessions (40 for IPv6, 20 for IPv4),
U is the size of the UDP header (8),
R is the size of a Netlink attribute header,
and S is the size of a serialized session.

R should be constant (unless something has gone horribly wrong), but ultimately depends on your kernel version. S depends on your Jool version, and should only change between minor updates (ie. when the first or second numbers of Jool’s version change). One way to find both is by running Jool’s joold unit test:

$ cd /path/to/jool/source
$ cd test/unit/joold
$ make
$ sudo make test | head
...
Jool: Netlink attribute header size: 4
Jool: Serialized session size: 40
...

So the default value came out of

floor((1500 - max(20, 40) - 8 - 4) / 40)

global Mode

Index

Description

Syntax

Examples

Keys

manually-enabled

pool6

lowest-ipv6-mtu

logging-debug

address-dependent-filtering

drop-icmpv6-info

drop-externally-initiated-tcp

udp-timeout

tcp-est-timeout

tcp-trans-timeout

icmp-timeout

maximum-simultaneous-opens

source-icmpv6-errors-better

logging-bib

logging-session

zeroize-traffic-class

override-tos

tos

amend-udp-checksum-zero

randomize-rfc6791-addresses

mtu-plateaus

eam-hairpin-mode

rfc6791v4-prefix

rfc6791v6-prefix

f-args

handle-rst-during-fin-rcv

ss-enabled

ss-flush-asap

ss-flush-deadline

ss-capacity

ss-max-payload

ss-max-sessions-per-packet